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CORPORATE REPORTING UNDER THE U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION’S DIVERSITY 
DISCLOSURE RULE: A MIXED-METHODS CONTENT ANALYSIS 
Introduction 
   
 In 2009, the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) adopted a rule requiring 
publicly traded firms to report on whether they consider diversity in identifying director nominees and, 
if so, how. The rule also requires firms that have adopted a diversity policy to describe how they 
implement the policy and assess its effectiveness. The rule does not define “diversity,” however, leaving 
it to corporations to give this term meaning.  
 
  Calls for disclosure-based efforts to address diversity in the corporate governance arena are not 
new. Almost twenty years ago, the Federal Glass Ceiling Commission, a bipartisan body formed under 
the Civil Rights Act of 1991,1 argued that public reporting of diversity-related information “motivates 
organizations to begin a process of positive social change,”2 and that disclosing “data on the most senior 
positions . . . is an effective incentive to develop and maintain innovative, effective programs to break 
glass ceiling barriers.”3 Accordingly, the commission “urge[d] the Federal government and its agencies to 
look for ways to increase public access to diversity data,”4 specifically suggesting disclosure 
requirements under US securities law as a viable avenue.5 
 
  In chapter 3, I introduced the SEC diversity disclosure rule, highlighted its conceptual 
underpinnings, and engaged with critical reactions to the new measure. I presented the rule as form of 
new governance, reflexive-style regulation that seeks to influence corporate behavior without resort to 
coercive sanction. In this chapter, I offer preliminary insights into how firms have responded to the rule. 
These early data offer a beginning point for analysis of how a reflexive law mechanism (disclosure) that 
contemplates a particular policy objective (board diversity) translates into practice.6 Will the SEC 
disclosure rule eventually catalyze a process of critical self-reflection that, coupled with the potential for 
shaming, transforms corporate thinking on governance and representation?  
 
This question engages a long-standing, core preoccupation of socio-legal research: the potential 
divide between law as codified and law in operation.7 While a wide body of reflexive and new 
                                                     
1
 Pub L No 102-166, § 203, 105 Stat 1071 at 1082 (codified as amended at 42 USC § 2000e). 
2
 US, Glass Ceiling Commission, A Solid Investment: Making Full Use of the Nation's Human Capital (Washington, 
DC: US Government Printing Office, 1995) at 42. 
3
 Ibid at 15. 
4
 Ibid at 42. 
5
 Ibid at 43 (with respect to corporate officer positions, in particular).  
6
 I recognize that my characterization of the rule’s intent is contestable, given the SEC’s position that the rule is not 
attempting to direct behavior. However, as I discuss below, I believe the SEC’s claim should be viewed with 
skepticism.  
7
 Patrick Schmidt & Simon Halliday, “Beyond Methods - Law and Society in Action” in Simon Halliday & Patrick 
Schmidt, eds, Conducting Law and Society Research: Reflections on Methods and Practices (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009) 1 at 2; Mike McConville & Wing Hong Chui, “Introduction and Overview” in Mike 
McConville & Wing Hong Chui, eds, Research Methods for Law (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007) 1 at 
5. For a recent review of the early law and society literature addressing this theme, see Martha Albertson Fineman, 
“Feminism, Masculinities, and Multiple Identities” (2013) 13:2 Nev LJ 619 at 632-33. 
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governance literature makes “ambitious claims”8 about the capacity of reflexive models to transcend the 
rigidity and “intrusive prescription” of command-and-control regulation,9 the application of these 
models to concrete situations is still in an early stage of development.10 As Schneiberg and Bartley note, 
“[S]cholarship on new regulatory forms has produced far more empirical research on their rise and 
character than on their translation into practice.”11  
 
Because the SEC’s diversity rule is still in its infancy, it remains too early to reach any definitive 
conclusions concerning its impact on board composition or corporate governance more generally. My 
goals in exploring “regulation in action,” therefore, are two-fold. First, I hope to inform future analyses 
of the disclosure rule’s results, to be conducted when more abundant data exist. Eventually, the 
available data will enable comprehensive study of the causal or correlative relationship between the 
diversity disclosure rule and diversity levels on corporate boards.12 Second, I hope to shape current SEC 
practice by explaining how corporations have interpreted its disclosure rule to date.  
 
In conducting this preliminary study, I strove to understand the different meanings that US 
corporations attribute to “diversity” in their disclosures. To that end, I compiled and analyzed the 
information reported under the SEC rule by firms included in the Standard & Poor's (“S&P”) 100 Index 
for four full proxy seasons, from 2010 to 2013. This entailed culling the diversity-related content from 
firms’ proxy statements, which, for a number of companies, exceeded one hundred pages. Proxy 
statements are documents that contain information relevant to investors in exercising their voting 
rights. Listed companies must file their proxy statement with the SEC and distribute the statement to 
shareholders in advance of a shareholders’ meeting.  
 
I elaborate on my findings in considerable detail below, but some of the important insights my 
study reveals are the following: 
 
 During the notice and comment period on the rule, which included various reforms related to 
compensation and corporate governance disclosure, nearly 40 percent of commenters discussed 
diversity. Of those commenters, the overwhelming majority supported the diversity component 
of the rule and defined diversity with reference to gender and race or ethnicity. 
 
                                                     
8
 Bradley C Karkkainen, “‘New Governance’ In Legal Thought and in the World: Some Splitting as Antidote to 
Overzealous Lumping” (2004) 89:2 Minn L Rev 471 at 476. 
9
 Ibid at 474. 
10
 Ibid at 476-477. 
11
 Marc Schneiberg & Tim Bartley, “Organizations, Regulation, and Economic Behavior: Regulatory Dynamics and 
Forms from the Nineteenth to Twenty-First Century” (2008) 4 Ann Rev L & Soc Sci 31 at 49. See also Anna Gelpern, 
“Hard, Soft, and Embedded: Implementing Principles on Promoting Responsible Sovereign Lending and Borrowing” 
in Carlos Espósito, Yuefen Li & Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky, eds, Sovereign Financing and International Law: The 
UNCTAD Principles on Responsible Sovereign Lending and Borrowing (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2013) 
347 at 362 (“Empirical studies of the effectiveness of new governance are still sparse and inconclusive.”); David M 
Trubek & Louise G Trubek, “New Governance and Legal Regulation: Complementarity, Rivalry or Transformation” 
(2007) 13:3 Colum J Eur L 539 at 543, 560 (“We . . . recognize that substantial further work needs to be done to 
clarify terminology, secure empirical information, and develop a more sophisticated typology”; “This process will 
require careful delineation of variables and substantial empirical work. . . . [T]here is very little hard data available 
on most of the cases we have identified.”).  
12
 See also Thomas Lee Hazen & Lissa Lamkin Broome, “Board Diversity and Proxy Disclosure” (2011) 37:1 U Dayton 
L Rev 39 at 73-74.  
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 Overall levels of compliance with the rule after its promulgation were high; in all years, most 
proxy statements reflected the consideration of diversity.  
 
 While corporations gave the term “diversity” multiple meanings, only approximately half 
reported on the socio-demographic characteristics of gender, race, or ethnicity. Firms most 
frequently defined diversity with reference to experiential and related factors. 
 
 Many firms discussed why they considered diversity in identifying director nominees. Most 
frequently, they indicated that a diverse board provides a plurality of perspectives and 
experiences, results in more informed decision-making processes, expands knowledge available 
to the corporation, and enhances judgment.  
 
 Few firms disclosed the existence of a formal diversity policy. Many more disclosed the absence 
of a policy or were silent. A number of firms that did not explicitly acknowledge having a policy 
appeared nonetheless to have adopted something similar, which I treated as a “functional 
equivalent” in my analysis. 
 
 The finding regarding firms’ definition of diversity is particularly revealing. The SEC’s decision 
not to define diversity left room for corporations to give the term content. That social identity 
categories were not more prominent in the disclosures serves as a preliminary caution that the SEC rule, 
in the future, may not produce diversity-enhancing results along socio-demographic lines. Officially, the 
SEC disavows any desire to affect firms’ conduct or encourage any particular type of diversity.13 As I 
explain in more detail in chapter 7, however, I believe this claim should be viewed with skepticism. The 
agency previously has made statements accepting disclosure as a conduct-influencing tool,14 and SEC 
commissioners’ unofficial public statements on the rule reflect a desired goal of increasing socio-
demographic representation.  
As a result, I ultimately agree with the rule’s detractors who, in analyzing the SEC’s 
representations on the rule when it was promulgated, argued that “[i]t strains credulity that this 
testimonial in favor of diversity policies . . . does not express a policy preference.”15 Unlike detractors, 
however, I believe the SEC should adopt a rule specifically designed to elicit information related to 
identity-based diversity with the end objective of promoting this type of diversity on boards. I explore 
the reasons for this belief in chapter 7 and discuss how the SEC might reform its rule to better serve 
these objectives. In this chapter, I begin by reporting the results of my study. 
Methodology and research questions   
  In my study, I used content analysis as the primary research method. Content analysis is a “form 
of textual analysis used to identify, enumerate, and analyze occurrences of specific messages and 
message characteristics embedded in relevant texts.”16 In undertaking this technique, the researcher 
aims to “mak[e] replicable and valid inferences from texts (or other meaningful matter) to the contexts 
                                                     
13
 SEC, Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, Securities Act Release No 33-9089 (16 December 2009) at 80, 38-39 [SEC, 
Final Rule].  
14
 See my discussion of this point in chapter 3. 
15
 Laurie Smilan, “The New Enhanced Proxy Disclosure Rules – Ready, Set, Change and Now” (23 April 2010) at 8, 
online: SSRN <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1594969>.  
16
 Lawrence R Frey, Carl H Botan & Gary L Kreps, Investigating Communication: An Introduction to Research 
Methods (Needham Heights, Mass: Allyn & Bacon, 2000) at 413. 
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of their use.”17 In furtherance of this goal, the researcher constructs analytical categories used to place 
and classify written text (or “content units”).18 Although conventional content analysis is quantitative 
and involves counting the instances and forms of different features arising from the text,19 qualitative 
uses of this research method are now well established. This qualitative analysis, derived from the social 
sciences and critical and literary theory,20 strives to accomplish one of the key goals of qualitative 
research generally: the description and explanation of complex social phenomena.21 Holsti dismisses the 
inflexible division between the two quantitative and qualitative approaches, recommending that “the 
content analyst should use qualitative and quantitative methods to supplement each other” and that 
“[i]t is by moving back and forth between these approaches that the investigator is most likely to gain 
insight into the meaning of his data.”22 Researchers, in merging approaches, have referred to their mode 
of inquiry as qualitative–quantitative content analysis,23 hermeneutic content analysis, and content 
analysis within a mixed-methods framework.24 
 
  Adopting Hsieh and Shannon’s definition of qualitative content analysis as “a research method 
for the subjective interpretation of the content of text data through the systematic classification process 
of coding and identifying themes or patterns,”25 I am chiefly concerned with understanding how firms 
conceptualize and articulate their understanding of diversity. What meanings, principles, values, 
intentions, and modes of discourse emerge from the textual data? How do firms discursively perform 
“diversity”? For this aspect of the study, I used a “conventional” analysis, considered appropriate when 
a researcher seeks to characterize a particular phenomenon. This approach involves “inductive category 
                                                     
17
 Klaus Krippendorff, Content Analysis: An Introduction to its Methodology, 3d ed (Los Angeles: SAGE, 2013) at 24.  
18
Carol Ann Tilt, “The Content and Disclosure of Australian Corporate Environmental Policies” (2001) 14:2 Acct 
Auditing & Accountability J 190 at 196; Markus J Milne & Ralph W Adler, “Exploring the Reliability of Social and 
Environmental Disclosures Content Analysis” (1999) 12:2 Acct Auditing & Accountability J 237 at 237. 
19
 Colin Robson, Real World Research, 3d ed (Padstow, Great Britain: John Wiley, 2011) at 350.  
20
 Krippendorff, supra note 17 at 23. 
21
 Catherine Pope, Sue Ziebland & Nicholas Mays, “Qualitative Research in Health Care: Analysing Qualitative Data” 
(2000) 320:7227 Brit Med J 114 at 114. For a review of the evolution of qualitative content analysis, see Florian 
Kohlbacher, “The Use of Qualitative Content Analysis in Case Study Research”, online: (2006) 7:1 Forum: 
Qualitative Soc Res 21 at s 4.2 <http://www.qualitative-research.net/index.php/fqs/article/view/75/153>. 
22
 Ole R Holsti, Content Analysis for the Social Sciences and Humanities (Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley, 1969) at 
11. See also Yan Zhang & Barbara M Wildemuth, “Qualitative Analysis of Content” in Barbara M Wildemuth, ed, 
Applications of Social Research Methods to Questions in Information and Library Science (Westport, Conn: Libraries 
Unlimited, 2009) 308 at 309 (“In real research work, the two approaches are not mutually exclusive and can be 
used in combination.”). For Mayring, qualitative content analysis should seek “to preserve the advantages of 
quantitative content analysis for a more qualitative text interpretation.” Philipp Mayring, “Qualitative Content 
Analysis”, online: (2000) 1:2 Forum: Qualitative Social Research 20 at s 3: <http://www.qualitative-
research.net/index.php/fqs/article/view/1089/2385>. 
23
 See e.g. Sara Zamir & Sara Hauphtman, “The Portrayal of the Jewish Figure in Literary Texts Included in the 
Present Matriculation Curriculum in Hebrew for Students of the Arab Sector in Israel” (2009) 7:1 J Critical Edu Pol’y 
Stud 216; Amelie Cserer & Alexandra Seiringer, “Pictures of Synthetic Biology: A Reflective Discussion of the 
Representation of Synthetic Biology (SB) in the German-Language Media and by SB Experts” (2009) 3 Systems & 
Synthetic Biology 27. 
24
 Manfred Max Bergman, “Hermeneutic Content Analysis: Textual and Audiovisual Analyses within a Mixed 
Methods Framework” in Abbas Tashakkori & Charles Teddlie, eds, SAGE Handbook of Mixed Methods in Social & 
Behavioral Research, 2d ed (Thousand Oaks, Cal: SAGE, 2010) 379. 
25
 Hsiu-Fang Hsieh & Sarah E Shannon, “Three Approaches to Qualitative Content Analysis” (2005) 15:9 Qualitative 
Health Res 1277 at 1278.  
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development,” where the researcher develops categories through his or her engagement with the data; 
they are not predetermined.26  
 
  But I also quantify the frequency of occurrences in the nonnumerical data. For example, were 
stakeholders who provided feedback on the SEC rule before it was adopted generally in favor of or 
opposed to the rule? What percentage of firms demonstrated a basic level of compliance with the rule? 
In discussing the concept of diversity in their disclosures, how many corporations chose to do so with 
reference to socio-demographic characteristics such as gender, race, and ethnicity, and how many chose 
other characteristics? And what number of disclosures revealed the adoption of corporate governance–
related diversity policies? I thus examine both the content and level of information reported through the 
processes of thematic and frequency coding. My analysis is both qualitative and quantitative.27 My view 
is that this fusion facilitates an expansive analysis that, in turn, permits a more nuanced understanding 
of the phenomena under study.28 I detail the specific methodological steps I took as I explore each phase 
of the regulation below, as well as in the appendix.29 
  
  A broad body of literature employing content analysis as a means of analyzing corporate 
reporting on environmental and social responsibility–related issues in corporate annual reports has 
emerged,30 and some studies include workplace gender issues voluntarily presented in corporate 
reports prior to the SEC requirement.31 Few academic studies, however, have given in-depth, multi-year 
consideration to the proxy disclosures of firms under the SEC’s mandatory diversity disclosure rule.32 To 
                                                     
26
 Ibid at 1279. 
27
 Robert Philip Weber, Basic Content Analysis, 2d ed (Newbury Park, Cal: SAGE, 1990) at 41 (“Researchers must, of 
course, tailor their methods to the requirements of their research by selecting specific techniques and integrating 
them with other methods, substantive considerations, and theories.”). While the quantitative aspect of my analysis 
is similar to the “summative analysis” identified by Hsieh and Shannon, it is more traditionally quantitative than 
qualitative. Ibid at 1283-85. 
28
 Anthony J Onwuegbuzie & Charles Teddlie, “A Framework for Analyzing Data in Mixed Methods Research” in 
Abbas Tashakkori & Charles Teddlie, eds, Handbook of Mixed Methods in Social & Behavioral Research (Thousand 
Oaks, Cal: SAGE, 2003) 351 at 353. 
29
 As I discuss in the appendix, I employed four JD students from 2010–2014 to assist with data collection and 
coding. 
30
 James Guthrie & Indra Abeysekera, “Content Analysis of Social, Environmental Reporting: What Is New?” (2006) 
10:2 J Hum Resource Costing & Acct 114 at 114. 
31
 For a review of this scholarship, and a further empirical contribution based on a sample of UK, Australian and US 
companies, see Kate Grosser, Corporate Social Responsibility, Gender Equality and Organizational Change: A 
Feminist Perspective (D Phil Thesis, University of Nottingham, 2011) [unpublished]. Of particular note is the 
following conclusion, presented after reviewing voluntarily produced firm disclosures found in annual and 
corporate social responsibility reports and on corporate websites: “Many aspects of gender inequality in the 
workplace . . . remain invisible. . . . [T]he most glaring omissions include lack of systematic, comparable reporting 
on women in management.” (Ibid at 156). 
32
 The extant empirical literature, both academic and nonacademic, includes: Hazen & Broome, supra note 12 
(reviewing one hundred 2010 proxy statements and comparing same to each firm’s 2009 statement); Kimberly 
Gladman, “Beyond the Boilerplate: The Performance Impacts of Board Diversity” (29 July 2010), online: The 
Corporate Library <http://www.thecorporatelibrary.com/reports.php?reportid=327> (reviewing 388 2010 proxy 
statements); Calvert Investments, “Examining the Cracks in the Ceiling: A Survey of Corporate Diversity Practices of 
the S&P 100” (October 2010) at 15, online: 
<www.calvert.com/nrc/literature/documents/CorporateDiversity2010.pdf> (reviewing ninety 2010 proxy 
statements and ten governance charters; see also Calvert’s similar analysis of 2012 proxy statements: Calvert 
Investments, “Examining the Cracks in the Ceiling: A Survey of Corporate Diversity Practices of the S&P 100” 
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remedy that gap, I studied the SEC rule as it existed in three stages, using three data sets. Table 6.1 sets 
out these stages and the questions I pursued with respect to each one. I discuss each stage in turn. 
 
Table 6.1 – Stages, data sets, and research questions 
Stage Data set Research questions 
1. Prerule adoption Letters submitted to the SEC in 
response to its feedback request 
1. How did stakeholders respond to 
the proposed rule? 
2. Corporate reporting 
under the rule 
2010–2013 proxy statements of 
S&P 100 firms 
1. Did firms achieve minimal 
compliance with the rule? 
2. How did firms consider the 
concept of diversity? 
3. What, if any, rationales did firms 
provide for their consideration of 
diversity? 
4. Did firms disclose the existence of 
diversity policies? If so, did they 
comply with the rule’s additional 
reporting requirements regarding 
implementation and effectiveness? 
3. Regulatory response 
subsequent to corporate 
reporting 
Comment letters sent by the SEC 
to issuers, and response letters 
1. How many firms received a 
diversity-related comment letter? 
2. How did the SEC react to the 
diversity-related disclosures? What 
was the nature of the agency’s 
observations and what do they reveal 
about its approach to the rule?  
3. How did issuers receive the SEC’s 
guidance? 
   
Stage 1: Prerule adoption 
 
A. Data collection and results 
 
Reflexive and related approaches to regulatory design are intended to be transparent and 
cooperative, and to emphasize the role of multiple societal groups. The theory is that compliance rates 
                                                                                                                                                                           
(March 2013), online: <www.calvert.com/NRC/literature/documents/BR10063.pdf>); Louis L Goldberg & Janice 
Brunner, “Board Diversity and Director Qualifications” (August 2010) at 3, online: The Conference Board 
<www.conference-board.org/retrievefile.cfm?filename=DN-012-10.pdf&type=subsite> (reviewing twenty-seven 
2010 proxy statements); Barbara Black, “Stalled: Gender Diversity on Corporate Boards” (2011) 37:1 U Dayton L 
Rev 7 (reviewing ten 2010 proxy statements); Catherine Bromilow, Joseph Atkinson & Scott Olsen, “New 
Governance Disclosures: The First Year’s Results” (September/October 2010) 31:184 The Corporate Board 1 at 4-5 
(reviewing one hundred 2010 proxy statements for governance disclosure trends generally); and Tamara S 
Smallman, “The Glass Boardroom: The SEC’s Role In Cracking the Door Open so Women May Enter” [2013] Colum 
Bus L Rev 801 (reviewing fifty 2012 proxy statements). Along similar lines, Singh and Point also note the paucity of 
studies regarding diversity statements on corporate websites. See Val Singh & Sébastien Point, “(Re)Presentations 
of Gender and Ethnicity in Diversity Statements on European Company Websites” (2006) 68:4 J Bus Ethics 363 at 
363-64. 
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will be higher when regulated subjects and other entities participate in standard development, and that 
a participatory process leads to each segment assuming shared responsibility for regulatory results.33  
 
  In what I have labelled stage 1, the SEC sought feedback on various proposed reforms related to 
compensation and corporate governance disclosure. Before ultimately implementing the diversity 
component of its final rule, the agency posed the following questions:  
 
We are interested in understanding whether investors and other market participants 
believe that diversity in the boardroom is a significant issue. . . . Should we amend Item 
407(c)(2)(v) to require disclosure of any additional factors that a nominating committee 
considers when selecting someone for a position on the board, such as diversity? Should 
we amend our rules to require additional or different disclosure related to board 
diversity?34  
 
  In my study, I asked how stakeholders responded to the proposed rule. The regulator received 
145 response letters from a range of market participants and other interested parties, including 
institutional investors, retail investors, law and accounting firms, companies, and academics.35 I analyzed 
all of them, coding each letter for whether it mentioned diversity and supported or opposed the SEC 
rule. I also assessed whether a commentator proposed a definition for the term diversity and whether 
that definition included gender, race, or ethnicity.  
 
 Of the letters in the population, 37.9 percent (n=55) explicitly mentioned diversity while 62.1 
percent (n=90) did not, commenting instead on other aspects of the proposed rule. In the former group, 
90.9 percent (n=50) supported diversity-related governance disclosure while 9.1 percent (n=5) did not. 
These figures are presented in Figure 6.1, below. 
 
Figure 6.1 – Stakeholder responses to the proposed SEC diversity disclosure rule 
 
   
Of the fifty letters that supported diversity disclosure, 88 percent (n=44) provided a definition of 
diversity, while 12 percent (n=6) did not. Seventy-six percent of the letters in support (n=38) defined 
diversity with reference to gender, 62 percent (n=31) with reference to race or ethnicity, and 16 percent 
                                                     
33
 Gelpern, supra note 11 at 360.  
34
 SEC, Proxy Disclosure and Solicitation Enhancements, Securities Act Release No 33-9052 (10 July 2009) at 30-31. 
35
 SEC, Final Rule, supra note 13 at 5. This figure excludes two duplicate letters and twelve memoranda 
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(n = 8) with reference to age. Twenty-six percent (n=13) defined diversity in terms of other demographic 
characteristics, such as culture and geography, 32 percent (n=16) in terms of experiential characteristics 
such as “background,” “skills,” “experience,” and “expertise,” and 34 percent (n=17) in terms of generic 
factors such as “viewpoint,” “background,” “thought,” “perspective,” and “personal attributes.”36  
   
  The letters supporting diversity disclosure cited a range of justifications for the rule,37 including 
the potential of diversity to enhance financial performance;38 the benefits that a plurality of 
perspectives may bring to decision making;39 heightened responsiveness to diverse nonshareholder 
stakeholders such as suppliers, customers, and employees;40 and the promotion of inclusivity and 
prevention of workplace discrimination.41 Interestingly, one letter, which supported diversity disclosure 
only if shareholders considered it relevant, recommended that the ethnicity of each director or nominee 
be disclosed and that a color photo be included in order to facilitate truthfulness: “The photo will serve 
to keep self-described ethnicity ‘honest.’ If a director describes himself as ‘Hispanic’ but his photo looks 
‘White Anglo-Saxon Protestant,’ shareowners will draw appropriate conclusions.”42  
 
The letters opposing diversity disclosure expressed the view that existing rules implicitly 
included diversity such that explicit provisions were unnecessary;43 that firms already provided sufficient 
disclosure;44 and that such disclosure would serve no helpful purpose vis-à-vis shareholder voting.45 One 
commentator registered vehement objection to the consideration of ethnicity or race in the selection of 
                                                     
36
 More information on these categories follows in stage 2, below.  
37
 Various letters, of course, cited multiple rationales. 
38
 See e.g. Letter from Anne Simpson, Senior Portfolio Manager, Global Equity, CalPERS Investment Office, to 
Elizabeth M Murphy, Secretary, SEC (16 September 2009) at 3; Letter from Ilene H Lang, President & CEO, Catalyst, 
to Elizabeth M Murphy, Secretary, SEC (15 September 2009) at 2; Letter from David H Zellner, Chief Investment 
Officer, General Board of Pension and Health Benefits of the United Methodist Church, to Elizabeth M Murphy, 
Secretary, SEC (15 September 2009) at 2; Letter from Ernst & Young LLP to Elizabeth M Murphy, Secretary, SEC (15 
September 2009) at 4; Letter from Justin Levis, Senior Research Associate, Council of Institutional Investors, to 
Elizabeth M Murphy, Secretary, SEC (8 September 2009) at 3. 
39
 See e.g. Letter from Calvert Group, Ltd to Elizabeth M Murphy, Secretary, SEC (15 September 2009) at 2; Letter 
from Mary Kay Craig, Associate, Sisters of Charity, BVM, to Elizabeth M Murphy, Secretary, SEC (15 September 
2009) at 1; Letter from Dawn Wolfe, Associate Director of ESG Research, Boston Common Asset Management, et al 
to Elizabeth M Murphy, Secretary, SEC (14 September 2009) at 2. 
40
 See e.g. Letter from Cheryl Smith, President, Trillium Asset Management Corp, to Elizabeth M Murphy, 
Secretary, SEC (15 September 2009) at 1-2; Letter from Julie Fox Gorte, Senior VP for Sustainable Investing, Pax 
World Management Corp, & Tracey C Rembert, Sustainability Analyst and Governance Advocate, Pax World 
Management Corp, to Elizabeth M Murphy, Secretary, SEC (12 September 2009) at 8. 
41
 See e.g. Letter from Timothy Smith, Senior VP, Walden Asset Management, to Elizabeth M Murphy, Secretary, 
SEC (14 September 2009) at 1; Letter from Lisa Woll, CEO, Social Investment Forum, to Elizabeth M Murphy, 
Secretary, SEC (14 September 2009) at 1.  
42
 Letter from Glyn A Holton, Executive Director, United States Proxy Exchange, et al to Elizabeth M Murphy, 
Secretary, SEC (15 September 2009) at 15.  
43
 Letter from Jeffrey W Rubin, Chair, Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities, Section of Business Law, 
American Bar Association, to Elizabeth M Murphy, Secretary, SEC (16 October 2009) at 26. 
44
 Letter from Alexander M Cutler, Chair, Corporate Leadership Initiative, Business Roundtable, to Elizabeth M 
Murphy, Secretary, SEC (15 September 2009) at 6. 
45
 Letter from Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP to Elizabeth M Murphy, Secretary, SEC (15 September 2009) at 
7. 
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board candidates.46 Another opined that requiring diversity disclosure may lead to diversity being 
misunderstood as a “qualification,” which would result in the degradation of minority and female 
candidates.47  
 
Stage 2: Corporate reporting under the SEC diversity disclosure rule 
 
The level of stakeholder support for the rule during the comment phase prompted the SEC to 
move forward with its diversity disclosure initiative. In stage 2 of my study, I engaged in a detailed 
exploration of the nature of the corporate disclosures submitted under the rule. 
  




  The research sample for stage 2 of my analysis consisted of a hand-collected dataset of the 
2010–2013 definitive proxy statements of S&P 100 firms.48 I chose the S&P 100 to achieve both data 
homogeneity and heterogeneity.49 The index consists of one hundred “major, blue-chip companies” with 
a market capitalization “of USD 4.6 billion or greater,”50 all of which are subject to the diversity 
disclosure rule. The similarity of the firms in this defined population permitted “meaningful comparisons 
of the processes and actors involved.”51 At the same time, the index’s membership is diverse, 
representing a cross-section of industries,52 and amounts to almost 45 percent of overall US market 
capitalization.53 While smaller than the S&P 500, the S&P 100 represents approximately 60 percent of 
the larger index’s market capitalization and demonstrates less turnover.54  
 
  The sample was populated from the index as of December 16, 2010. While the index’s 
                                                     
46
 Letter from Roger Clegg, President & General Counsel, Center for Equal Opportunity, to Elizabeth M Murphy, 
Secretary, SEC (1 September 2009).  
47
 Letter from John C Guerra, Jr, CEO, New America Alliance, to Elizabeth M Murphy, Secretary, SEC (2 September 
2009) at 2. 
48
 In discussing the results of my study below, I frequently use firms’ 2011 proxy statements as representat ive 
examples. 
49
 Alan Bryman, Social Research Methods, 3d ed (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008) at 375. Other recent 
corporate governance–related empirical studies using the S&P 100 as a sample population include Marcel Kahan & 
Edward Rock, “Embattled CEOs” (2010) 88:5 Tex L Rev 987; Marcia Millon Cornett, Alan J Marcus & Hassan 
Tehranian, “Corporate Governance and Pay-for-Performance: The Impact of Earnings Management” (2008) 87:2 J 
Fin Econ 357. 
50
 Standard & Poor’s Dow Jones Indices, “Equity: S&P 100” (30 June 2014) at 1, online: 
<http://ca.spindices.com/idsenhancedfactsheet/file.pdf?calcFrequency=M&force_download=true&hostIdentifier=
48190c8c-42c4-46af-8d1a-0cd5db894797&indexId=2431> [Standard & Poor’s].  
51
 Sally Maitlis & Thomas B Lawrence, “Triggers and Enablers of Sensegiving in Organizations” (2007) 50:1 Academy 
Mgmt J 57 at 59. 
52
 Standard & Poor’s, supra note 50 at 1. 
53
 Russell Rhoads, Trading VIX Derivatives: Trading and Hedging Strategies Using VIX Futures, Options, and 
Exchange-Traded Notes (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2011) at 29; Bowgett Investments, “S&P 100 Index” (3 
July 2014), online: <http://www.bowgett.com/Markets/IndexDetails.aspx?i=SP100>. 
54
 Ibid; Fenwick & West LLP, “Corporate Governance Practices and Trends: A Comparison of Large Public 
Companies and Silicon Valley Companies” (2012) at 33, n 14, online: 
<http://www.fenwick.com/FenwickDocuments/2012-Corporate-Governance-Survey.pdf> (quoting Standard & 
Poor’s).  
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components change periodically, I selected companies from a fixed date in order to compare the 
disclosures of a specific set of firms over the study’s four-year period.55 The only discrepancy in the data 
arose in 2013, when two firms did not file proxy statements; accordingly, the sample size for that year is 
ninety-eight.56 Table 6.2 presents a list of the companies studied. I also categorized the sample according 
to the ten sector codes used in the Global Industry Classification Standard, as reported in Bloomberg 
Law. Figure 6.2 presents the results of this industry categorization.  
 
Table 6.2 – Research sample  
 
1 3M Co 26 Coca-Cola Co 51 Honeywell Intl Inc  76 Philip Morris International  
2 AT&T Inc 27 Colgate-Palmolive Co 52 Intel Corp  77 Procter & Gamble 
3 Abbott Laboratories  28 Comcast Corp 53 Intl Business Machines  78 QUALCOMM Inc 
4 Alcoa Inc 29 ConocoPhillips  54 JP Morgan Chase & Co 79 Raytheon Co  
5 Allstate Corp  30 Costco Wholesale Corp  55 Johnson & Johnson  80 Regions Financial Corp  
6 Altria Group Inc  31 Dell Inc  56 Kraft Foods Inc57  81 Sara Lee Corp58 
7 Amazon.com Inc 32 Devon Energy Corp 57 Lockheed Martin  82 Schlumberger Ltd  
8 American Electric Power  33 Dow Chemical 58 Lowe's Cos Inc 83 Southern Co 
9 American Express Co 34 DuPont  59 MasterCard Inc  84 Sprint Nextel Corp59 
10 Amgen Inc 35 EMC Corp 60 McDonald's Corp  85 Target Corp 
11 Apple Inc 36 Entergy Corp 61 Medtronic Inc  86 Texas Instruments Inc 
12 Avon Products 37 Exelon Corp 62 Merck & Co Inc 87 The Bank of New York Mellon Corp  
13 Baker Hughes Inc 38 Exxon Mobil Corp 63 Metlife Inc  88 Time Warner Inc 
14 Bank of America Corp  39 FedEx Corp 64 Microsoft Corp  89 US Bancorp 
15 Baxter International Inc  40 Ford Motor Co  65 Monsanto Co. 90 United Parcel Service Inc  
16 Berkshire Hathaway Inc  41 Freeport McMoRan Copper & Gold  66 Morgan Stanley 91 United Technologies Corp  
17 Boeing Co 42 General Dynamics  67 NIKE Inc  92 Unitedhealth Group Inc  
18 Bristol Myers Squibb Co 43 General Electric Co  68 NYSE Euronext 93 Verizon Communications Inc  
19 CVS Caremark 44 Gilead Sciences Inc  69 National Oilwell Varco Inc  94 Wal-Mart Stores 
20 Cambell Soup Co 45 Goldman Sachs Group Inc 70 News Corporation60 95 Walgreen Co 
21 Capital One Financial  46 Google Inc 71 Norfolk Southern Corp  96 Walt Disney Co  
22 Caterpillar Inc  47 Halliburton Co  72 Occidental Petroleum  97 Wells Fargo & Co 
23 Chevron Corp 48 Heinz, H.J. Co61 73 Oracle Corp  98 Weyerhaeuser Co  
24 Cisco Systems Inc 49 Hewlett-Packard Co 74 PepsiCo Inc 99 Williams Cos Inc 







                                                     
55
 Thirteen companies present in the 2010 index were no longer included as of September 30, 2013: Alcoa Inc., 
Avon Products, Baker Hughes Inc., Campbell Soup Co., Dell Inc., Entergy Corp., Heinz Company, NYSE Euronext, 
Regions Financial Corp., Sara Lee Corp., Sprint Nextel Corp., Weyerhaeuser Co., and Xerox Corp. 
56
 See infra notes 59 and 61 regarding Sprint Nextel Corporation and the H.J. Heinz Company, respectively. 
57
 In 2012, Kraft Foods Inc. was renamed Mondelez International, Inc. 
58
 In 2012, Sara Lee Corporation was split into two companies; North American operations were renamed Hillshire 
Brands Company. 
59
 In 2013, Sprint Nextel Corporation discontinued the Nextel Network and reverted to its prior name, Sprint 
Corporation; it also merged with SoftBank Corp. The firm did not file a separate proxy statement that year. 
60
 In 2013, News Corporation was split into two companies, focusing on media and publishing, respectively. 
Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc. represents the latter and is News Corporation’s legal successor. 
61
 The H.J. Heinz Company was acquired by Berkshire Hathaway in 2013 and did not file a separate proxy 
statement that year. 
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Figure 6.2 – Breakdown of research sample by industry sector 
 
 
   
  The diversity and breadth of the index make it a sample sufficient to provide an indication of 
overall disclosure patterns. While I do not seek to establish statistical representation, and drawing 
conclusions as to how all issuers that file with the SEC consider diversity is not my goal, my study can 
help to elucidate possible generalizable conclusions. Williams acknowledges that the data qualitative 
researchers study typically cannot lead to statistical generalizations, but argues these data can produce 
“moderatum generalisations,” or moderate generalizations “where aspects of [the data] can be seen to 
be instances of a broader recognizable set of features.”62 While the patterns that emerge from this 
documentary analysis may not be determinative, they are suggestive of how firms consider diversity, are 
“likely to replicate themselves,” and will provide “working hypotheses” that inform subsequent 
studies.63 
 
(ii) Categorizing and coding “diversity”   
 
In qualitative content analysis, the unit of analysis is generally a specific theme or expressed 
idea, as opposed to an actual linguistic unit (such as a word or sentence).64 “A theme captures 
something important about the data in relation to the research question, and represents some level of 
                                                     
62
 Malcolm Williams, “Interpretivism and Generalisation” (2000) 34:2 Sociology 209 at 215. 
63
 Jannika Mattes, Innovation in Multinational Companies: Organisational, International and Regional Dilemmas  
(Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2010) at 110-11. See also Geoff Payne & Malcolm Williams, “Generalization in Qualitative 
Research” (2005) 39:2 Sociology 295 at 297 (“[Moderatum generalizations] are testable propositions that might be 
confirmed or refuted through further evidence.”). 
64
 Zhang & Wildemuth, supra note 22 at 310. 
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patterned response or meaning within the data set.”65 The unit on which I focused in my study was the 
theme of diversity as expressed in the corporate disclosures. Determining whether “diversity” was 
present in a disclosure entailed an interpretative process of locating both explicit and implicit content66 
through inductive reasoning. While I approached the data with some categories based on the secondary 
literature in mind, I gradually culled my analytical categories and themes from the data after careful, 
iterative study67 and after having considered all data holistically. This technique was particularly 
appropriate given the scarcity of prior academic studies.68  
 
I pursued four questions in stage 2 of my study. First, did firms achieve minimal compliance with 
the rule? Did they report on whether, and if so how, they considered diversity in identifying director 
nominees? Second, in what ways did firms consider diversity? Third, what rationales, if any, did firms 
provide for the ways in which they considered diversity? And finally, did firms disclose the existence of 
diversity policies and then comply with the rule’s additional reporting requirements regarding 
implementation and effectiveness? I consider the results of each inquiry in turn. 
 
B. Did firms achieve minimal compliance with the rule? 
 
  The first research question I pursued in stage 2 of my study was whether firms achieved minimal 
compliance with the rule. Did firms report on whether, and if so how, their boards or nominating 
committees considered diversity in identifying director nominees? 
 
  I separated the proxy statements into one of two groups. I coded those that gave specific 
consideration to diversity as “yes,” while those that were silent I coded as “no.” I considered statements 
that simply described the personal characteristics of existing directors (such as in the director 
biographies), rather than commenting on how diversity is considered in identifying director nominees, 
as not having met the requirements of the rule. Hewlett-Packard’s 2011 disclosure provides an example: 
 
Ms. Baldauf's knowledge of global business from both a consumer and an enterprise 
market perspective and her experience in large, emerging markets such as China and 
India have provided her with insight regarding building operations in diverse cultural 
environments as well as the importance of innovation. Ms. Baldauf also has a high level 
of understanding of the board's role and responsibilities based on her service on other 
public company boards. In addition, because of her service on the boards of several 
other international companies, Ms. Baldauf is able to provide insight regarding 
operating and governing a business in a diverse range of geographies.69 
 
                                                     
65
 Virginia Braun & Victoria Clarke, “Using Thematic Analysis in Psychology” (2006) 3:2 Qualitative Res Psychol 77 at 
82. 
66
 Bryman, supra note 49 at 282. See also ibid at 84 (“[A] thematic analysis at the latent level goes beyond the 
semantic content of the data, and starts to identify or examine the underlying ideas, assumptions, and 
conceptualizations – and ideologies – that are theorized as shaping or informing the semantic content of the 
data.”). 
67
 Zhang & Wildemuth, supra note 22 at 309.  
68
 Satu Elo & Helvi Kyngäs, “The Qualitative Content Analysis Process” (2008) 62:1 J Advanced Nursing 107 at 109 
(“If there is not enough former knowledge about the phenomenon or if this knowledge is fragmented, the 
inductive approach is recommended.”). 
69
 Hewlett-Packard Co, Definitive Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) (1 February 2011) at 27. 
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I made two exceptions to this rule. In 2012 and 2013, Honeywell International specifically linked its 
directors’ biographies to its approach to diversity.70 Likewise, in its 2011 disclosure, Bank of America 
described the diversity-related characteristics of its directors71 immediately following its consideration 
of diversity,72 implying a connection between the two.  
  
In cases where the statement did not make specific reference to the term “diversity” but used a 
functional equivalent (such as “variety”), I considered the company to have met the requirements of the 
rule, and coded the proxy statement “yes.” Qualcomm’s 2011 disclosure provides an example: “The 
Governance Committee’s goal is to assemble a board of directors that brings to us a variety of 
perspectives and skills derived from high quality business and professional experience. In doing so, the 
Governance Committee also considers candidates with appropriate non-business backgrounds.”73 In 
cases where neither the term “diversity” nor any functional equivalent was used, I considered 
companies to not be in compliance with the rule and coded their proxy statements “no”, even if the 
disclosures made reference to factors such as “prior experience” and “personal attributes,” given that 
they did not connect these factors to diversity or a functional equivalent.  
 
I found high levels of compliance, as depicted in Figure 6.3, below. In all four years, 98 percent 
of proxy statements reflected the consideration of diversity.74 It might be argued that a firm’s failure to 
provide any disclosure of diversity consideration is a form of compliance, because it signals that firms do 
not undertake any diversity-related consideration when appointing directors.75 But my view is that these 
firms are not in compliance, because the rule requires an active description of whether the firm took 
diversity into account. In all years, Hewlett-Packard and MetLife fell into this noncompliance category. 
Of course, compliance does not necessarily correspond with active consideration of diversity. Berkshire 
Hathaway, for example, fulfilled its reporting obligation in all years by expressly rejecting the 
incorporation of diversity into its board nomination process: “Berkshire does not have a policy regarding 
the consideration of diversity in identifying nominees for director. In identifying director nominees, the 
Governance, Compensation and Nominating Committee does not seek diversity, however defined.”76  
                                                     
70
 “Our current Board composition reflects this approach and the Board’s commitment to diversity.” See Honeywell 
International Inc, Definitive Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) (8 March 2012) at 13; Honeywell International Inc, 
Definitive Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) (7 March 2013) at 16.  
71
 “Of our 14 current directors, one is a citizen of India, one is African-American and two are women, one of whom 
is Hispanic.” Bank of America, Definitive Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) (30 March 2011) at 1. 
72
 “Although we do not have a formal policy regarding diversity, our Board views its diversity as a priority and seeks 
diverse representation among its members.” Ibid. 
73
 Qualcomm Inc, Definitive Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) (13 January 2010) at 8; Qualcomm Inc, Definitive 
Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) (20 January 2011) at 6 [emphasis added]. 
74
 As previously noted, the H.J. Heinz Company and Sprint Nextel Corporation did not file proxy statements in 2013. 
As such, the sample size for that year is ninety-eight, rather than one hundred. 
75
 Hazen and Broome note this potential argument. Supra note 12 at 61.  
76
 Berkshire Hathaway Inc, Definitive Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) (12 March 2010) at 5; Berkshire Hathaway 
Inc, Definitive Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) (11 March 2011) at 6; Berkshire Hathaway Inc, Definitive Proxy 
Statement (Form DEF 14A) (16 March 2012) at 6; Berkshire Hathaway Inc, Definitive Proxy Statement (Form DEF 
14A) (15 March 2013) at 6. Nonsample firms that have taken a similar approach include Lennar Corporation. See 
e.g. Lennar Corp, Definitive Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) (3 March 2011) at 11 (“The . . . Committee has not 
considered racial or ethnic diversity in evaluating possible directors. It does not believe race or ethnic background 
is relevant to a person’s qualifications to serve on the Board. While it recognizes the benefits of diversity of 
training and experience, it does not believe that race or ethnic background significantly affects a person’s ability to 
contribute to our Board.”). Branson refers to the possibility of such disclosures as the “Achilles Heel” of the SEC 
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Figure 6.3 – Corporate consideration of diversity 
 
 
C. How do firms consider diversity?   
 
Because the rule does not define diversity, understanding firms’ compliance requires further 
inquiry. I next explored how firms actually consider diversity in their director nomination processes. In 
the absence of guidance from the SEC, how is diversity understood and articulated? How do 
corporations make sense of diversity? What range of indicators is used to give life to this concept? To 
what extent do social identity–based factors, such as gender and race, emerge from the data as opposed 
to other forms of diversity representation? 
 
  I considered six categorical variables when determining how firms defined diversity. The first 
three involved conventional descriptive characteristics: (1) gender; (2) race and ethnicity; and/or (3) age. 
I coded a proxy statement “yes” if, in its consideration of diversity, the firm made explicit reference to 
one or more of the above characteristics, and “no” if it did not. I constructed the remaining three 
variables to adequately reflect the narrative data.77 I also coded a proxy statement “yes” if, in its 
consideration of diversity, the firm made explicit reference to: (4) “other demographic” factors; (5) 
“other experiential” factors; and/or (6) “generic” factors, and “no” if it did not.78 I explain these latter 
three indicators in more detail below.  
 
Firms defined diversity in numerous ways, as depicted in Figure 6.4, below. In all years studied, 
no more than roughly half of firms referenced socio-demographic indicators of diversity. Approximately 
half of the proxy statements referenced gender in the firm’s consideration of diversity (47, 52, 50, and 
52 percent for years 2010–2013, respectively). For race and ethnicity, the figures were slightly lower, 
but similarly close to 50 percent in all years (45, 50, 48, and 49 percent, respectively). Far fewer firms 
referenced age (24, 23, 23, and 23 percent, respectively). Citigroup’s 2011 proxy statement illustrates 
how those firms that considered socio-demographic factors disclosed that fact: 
                                                                                                                                                                           
rule. See Douglas M Branson, “An Australian Perspective on a Global Phenomenon: Initiatives to Place Women on 
Corporate Boards of Directors” (2012) 27 Austl J Corp L 2 at 20.  
77
 Kimberly A Neuendorf et al, “Shaken and Stirred: A Content Analysis of Women’s Portrayals in James Bond 
Films” (2010) 62:11-12 Sex Roles 747 at 751. 
78
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Diversity is among the critical factors that the nomination and governance committee 
considers when evaluating the composition of the board. For a company like Citi, which 
operates in over 100 countries around the globe, diversity includes race, ethnicity and 
gender. . . . The board believes that the current nominees reflect an appropriate 
diversity of gender, age, race . . . but is committed to continuing to consider diversity 
issues in evaluating the composition of the board.79 
 
Figure 6.4 – Definition of diversity (n=100, 2010–2012; n=98, 2013) 
 
   
  Firms also referred to “other demographic” factors, beyond gender, race and ethnicity, and age, 
though these other factors appeared in the data with less frequency (40, 41, 39, and 40 percent, 
respectively). Most commonly, these other factors related to national origin or nationality, geographic 
representation or background, and citizenship. Over the four years of the study, 29, 31, 29, and 31 
percent of proxy statements referenced these variables. A small number of firms referenced cultural 
background or experience (6, 7, 7, and 6 percent, respectively), and an even smaller number used the 
terms “minority groups” (2 percent in all years) or “other demographics” (3 percent in all years). For 
example, in 2011, Goldman Sachs reported: “Our Board believes that diversity is an important attribute 
of a well-functioning board. In selecting qualified candidates to serve as directors, the Committee 
considers a range of types of diversity, including race, gender, ethnicity, culture, nationality and 
geography, seeking to develop a board that, as a whole, reflects diverse viewpoints, backgrounds, skills, 
experiences and expertise.”80 Figure 6.5 presents this data. As of 2013, only two firms—Goldman Sachs 
and Bank of New York Mellon—included sexual orientation or preference in their respective definitions 
of diversity.81 Outside of nondiscrimination provisions (discussed in the appendix), no firms included 
other social identity categories such as disability or class.82 
                                                     
79
 Citigroup Inc, Definitive Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) (10 March 2011) at 8 [emphasis added] [Citigroup 
2011]. 
80
 The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc, Definitive Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) (1 April 2011) at 12 [emphasis added] 
[Goldman 2011]. 
81
 The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc, Definitive Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) (12 April 2013) at 7; Bank of New 
York Mellon Corp, Definitive Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) (8 March 2013) at 2. 
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Figure 6.5 – Other demographic information (n=100, 2010–2012; n=98, 2013) 
 
  
  By far the most frequent manner in which firms elected to define the concept of diversity did 
not involve identity-based indicators, but rather focused on “other experiential” factors, or companies’ 
expressed preference for directors who brought a diversity of experience to their positions. In 2010, 83 
percent of disclosures, and in 2011—2013, 87, 87, and 88 percent of disclosures, respectively, described 
diversity in this way. The firms that defined diversity in terms of “other experiential” factors reported a 
wide range of desirable experience and I further disaggregated the data to reflect this breadth, as shown 
in the twenty-one subcategories represented in Table 6.3, below. Perhaps not surprisingly, experiential 
backgrounds expressed with a high degree of generality appeared most frequently in the data: relevant 
knowledge, skills, experience (58, 61, 60, and 60 percent, respectively); general professional experience 
(28 percent in 2010–2012 and 29 percent in 2013); and business/industry experience (25, 28, 28, and 27 
percent, respectively). Of the more specific types of experiential backgrounds that firms articulated as 
desired, the following were most prevalent: scientific, engineering, technology, R&D (14 percent in 2010 
and 15 percent in 2011–2013); finance, accounting (13 percent in 2010 and 15 percent in 2011–2013); 
government, public affairs, policy (13 percent in 2010, 16 percent in 2011–2012, and 15 percent in 
2013); and educational background (12 percent in 2010–2011 and 11 percent in 2012–2013).  
 
Table 6.3 – “Other experiential” codes (n=100, 2010–2012; n=98, 2013) 
 
  2010 2011 2012 2013 
Relevant knowledge, skills, experience 58% 61% 60% 60% 
General professional experience 28% 28% 28% 29% 
Business/ industry experience 25% 28% 28% 27% 
Scientific, engineering, technology, R&D 14% 15% 15% 15% 
Finance, accounting 13% 15% 15% 15% 
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Educational background 12% 12% 11% 11% 
International experience 10% 11% 11% 11% 
Academia, education, research 9% 9% 9% 9% 
Leadership 8% 7% 8% 7% 
Marketing 8% 8% 8% 8% 
Corp governance, board/ management experience 6% 6% 6% 5% 
Operations 5% 6% 6% 6% 
Manufacturing 4% 4% 4% 4% 
Judgment, competence 4% 4% 5% 5% 
Non-profit, public interest 2% 2% 2% 2% 
Economics 2% 2% 2% 2% 
Healthcare/ medicine 2% 2% 2% 2% 
Legal 1% 2% 2% 2% 
Environmental 1% 1% 1% 1% 
Technical expertise 1% 1% 1% 1% 
 
  Determining whether disclosures fit into this category required some particularly tricky coding 
decisions. In general, I coded proxy statements throughout the study “yes” if the firm made explicit 
reference to the particular variable(s) in the portion of the disclosure that involved its consideration of 
diversity. More specifically, I determined that any “other experiential” factors that a firm reported had 
to be sufficiently linked to the concept of diversity in order to be coded as responsive, because 
experiential factors could appear in a disclosure for reasons other than to respond to the diversity 
disclosure request. For instance, in its description of its director nomination process, the Campbell Soup 
Company discussed diversity, which it defined as including a suite of experiential factors—a formulation 
that led me to code the disclosure “yes” for “other experiential.” The disclosure notes: 
  
In addition, the Committee believes that, collectively, the Board should reflect 
appropriate diversity of thought, background and experience, and include directors who 
are:  
•  reasonably sophisticated about the duties and responsibilities of directors of a 
public company;  
•  knowledgeable about the consumer products industry, business operations, 
marketing, finance and accounting;  
• respected in the business community;  
• knowledgeable about general economic trends; and 
• knowledgeable about the standards and practices of good corporate 
governance. 
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All candidates considered by the Governance Committee for potential recommendation 
to the Board as director nominees are evaluated in light of the minimum qualifications 
listed above.83 
 
In establishing the connection between experience and diversity disclosure, I considered those 
disclosures that used euphemistic phrases for diversity, such as “range of”84 or “variety of,”85 followed 
by experiential factors, to have met the requirements of the rule and coded them “yes”. 
 
Finally, 72 percent of proxy statements in 2010–2012 and 71 percent in 2013 mentioned what I 
have called “generic” diversity factors. I used the descriptor “generic” to refer to disclosures that 
construed diversity in a somewhat amorphous manner. Text assigned to this group did not describe a 
specific characteristic and could not be captured under the headings of “other demographic” or “other 
experiential.” In these cases, the proxy statement may have used terms such as “viewpoint,” 
“background,” “perspective,” “personal attributes,” or “thought.” These terms may have been used in 
conjunction with more specific indicators assigned to other classifications. Home Depot, for example, 
reported: “The Nominating and Corporate Governance Committee recognizes the importance of 
selecting directors from various backgrounds and professions in order to ensure that the Board as a 
group has a wealth of experiences to inform its decisions. Consistent with this philosophy . . . the . . . 
Committee considers the personal attributes of individual nominees, including ethnic, racial and gender 
diversity.”86 In this case, I coded the proxy statement “yes” for “gender,” “race/ethnicity,” and “other 
experiential,” as well as for “generic,” given the presence of the words “various backgrounds.” Figure 6.6 
presents data concerning generic reporting.  
 
Figure 6.6 – Use of generic descriptors in firms’ consideration of diversity (n=100, 2010–2012; n=98, 2013) 
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 Campbell Soup Co, Definitive Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) (7 October 2011) at 1 [emphasis added]. 
84
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D.  What, if any, rationales did firms provide for their consideration of diversity? 
   
  Having analyzed how firms consider the idea of diversity in their director nomination processes, 
I also sought to determine whether firms explained why they did so. Why does diversity matter to these 
corporations? While the SEC rule does not require disclosure of such information, more than half of the 
firms in my research sample voluntarily offered at least some rationale for their consideration of 
diversity.  
 
  Again, I placed the proxy statements into one of two groups. I coded those in which the firm 
provided a rationale as “yes” and those that were silent as “no.” In the four years of the study, 53, 54, 
60, and 61 percent of proxy statements offered a justification for the firm’s consideration of diversity. 
Figure 6.7 presents these figures. I documented eight different rationales. The corresponding codes, 
with reporting percentages, are shown in Figure 6.8.87 
Figure 6.7 – Firms providing a rationale for their consideration of diversity (n=100, 2010–2012; n=98, 2013) 
 
Figure 6.8 – Stated rationales for firms’ consideration of diversity (of firms that provide an explanation; n=53, 2010; n=54, 
2011; n=60, 2012; n=61, 2013) 
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Firms that provided a rationale most frequently rooted their consideration of diversity in the 
concept of “perspectives” (42, 44, 43, and 42 percent of companies providing an explanation, in each of 
the study’s four years). These firms indicated that a diverse board brings a plurality of perspectives and 
experiences to governance, results in more informed decision-making processes, and enhances the 
board’s knowledge and judgment. Coco-Cola, for example, reported that “[t]he Board . . . considers 
diversity of race, ethnicity, gender, age, cultural background and professional experiences in evaluating 
candidates for Board membership. Diversity is important because a variety of points of view contribute 
to a more effective decision-making process.”88 Similarly, Baxter International disclosed that “[d]iversity 
of background, including diversity of gender, race, ethnic or national origin, age, and experience . . . is a 
relevant factor in the selection process. This factor is relevant as a diverse Board of Directors is likely to 
be a well-balanced Board with varying perspectives and a breadth of experience that will positively 
contribute to robust discussion at Board meetings.”89 
A noteworthy number of firms articulated an interest in “geographic and/or stakeholder 
representation” (28 percent in 2010–2011, 25 percent in 2012, and 23 percent in 2013). These firms 
indicated that diversity in governance complemented the company’s global business operations and 
could facilitate the representation of geographically diffuse stakeholders in the corporation. Citigroup’s 
proxy statement provides a case in point: “Diversity is among the critical factors that the nomination 
and governance committee considers when evaluating the composition of the board. For a company like 
Citi, which operates in over 100 countries around the globe, diversity includes race, ethnicity and gender 
as well as the diversity of the communities and geographies in which Citi operates.”90 According to 
Heinz’s disclosure:  
 
The Board believes that a diversity of background, perspectives, and experience is 
beneficial . . . and has identified certain key attributes to be represented on the Board. 
The Company’s business is global in scope and, as a result, the Board believes that 
international experience in global publicly-traded businesses and specific knowledge of 
certain geographical areas is important for effective and growth-driven leadership and 
should be represented.91 
 
 I classified roughly 20 percent of the proxy statements that included rationales for their diversity 
consideration as “inherent” (21, 19, 18, and 18 percent), because they presented board diversity as 
important or recognized it as valuable in and of itself, but did not elaborate why. Firms expressed this 
sentiment in different ways. For example, in 2010 Boeing reported that “diversity with respect to factors 
such as background, experience, skills, race, gender and national origin is an important consideration in 
board composition.”92 In 2011, the firm added that it “recognizes the value of diversity and [that] the 
Board seeks diversity . . . among its members.”93 Beyond these acknowledgements, however, these 
disclosures do not explain why diversity “is an important consideration,” or a value worth recognizing. 
In general, while the number of firms I classified as having reported one or more rationales for 
their consideration of diversity was fairly high (again, more than half of all disclosures in each year), the 
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explanations themselves were often vague. Goldman Sachs, as noted above, disclosed its belief that 
“diversity is an important attribute of a well-functioning board” and that the firm “considers a range of 
types of diversity, including race, gender, ethnicity, culture, nationality and geography, seeking to 
develop a board that . . . reflects diverse viewpoints, backgrounds, skills, experiences and expertise.”94 
So we learn that the firm considers diversity for two reasons: (1) it believes diversity contributes to a 
well-functioning board; and (2) it believes that the types of diversity listed will bring a range of 
perspectives and abilities to the board. But the disclosure does not precisely tell us why the firm holds 
these beliefs, or why it feels a diverse board is a better functioning board and why gender, racial, or 
cultural diversity, for example, necessarily serve as a proxy for varying views, experiences, and so on.95 
The biographical information of existing directors included in the proxy statements sometimes reveals 
this pattern as well. Alcoa, for instance, reports that a particular director’s “Asian perspective adds 
valuable diversity to the deliberations of the Board” without any further unpacking of what this “Asian 
perspective” specifically entails.96 Similarly, Colgate-Palmolive’s explanatory statement fits clearly into 
the geographic/stakeholder category, but additional facets of the statement, such as its discussion of 
the value of “diversity in the traditional sense,”97 were too ambiguous and ill defined to parse.  
  Other rationales firms less frequently expressed included linking board diversity to: expanding 
oversight capabilities, or monitoring of management (8, 11, 12, and 12 percent, respectively); providing 
leadership or guidance to the company (8, 7, 7, and 5 percent, respectively); enhancing effectiveness (6, 
7, 10, and 12 percent, respectively); promoting business success (8 percent in 2010 and 7 percent in 
2011–2013); and helping the board fulfill its responsibilities (4 percent in 2010–2011 and 3 percent in 
2012–2013).  
E. Did firms disclose the existence of diversity policies? If so, did they comply with the rule’s 
reporting requirements regarding implementation and effectiveness?  
 
The SEC rule does not obligate corporations to adopt a governance-related diversity policy. Nor 
does it require firms to disclose the absence of a policy. That said, if a firm has a policy, it must report on 
two elements: (1) how it implements the policy; and (2) how it assesses the policy’s effectiveness. I 
therefore considered whether the companies in my sample disclosed the existence of diversity policies 
and, if so, whether they complied with the rule’s reporting requirements. 
   
(i) The existence of diversity policies  
 
I divided the data into one of four groups. I coded proxy statements “yes” if the firm disclosed 
the existence of a diversity policy; “no” if the firm disclosed the absence of a policy; and “not disclosed” 
if the firm was silent (the statement contained no explicit reference to a policy). I coded a fourth group 
of statements that suggested an informal policy as “functional equivalent,” which is a concept I define in 
more detail below. 
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In all years of the study, 8 percent of firms in the sample disclosed the existence of a diversity 
policy. A substantial number of firms disclosed the absence of a policy (33, 36, 36, and 39 percent, 
respectively), while almost as many (28, 25, 25, and 21 percent, respectively) were silent. I categorized 
31 percent in 2010–2012 and 32 percent in 2013 as having functional equivalents of diversity policies. 
Figure 6.9 presents these figures. 
 
Figure 6.9 – Firm disclosures regarding diversity policies  
 
 
The firms that affirmatively reported the presence of a policy did so in one of two ways. In 2011, 
for example, five out of the eight firms referred to a dedicated board diversity policy, or to a general 
board membership policy or statement of qualifications and criteria for appointment, that included 
diversity as a component.98 The remaining three firms included diversity in a corporate document, such 
as a set of corporate governance guidelines or principles, and explicitly referred to this document as a 
policy or as a diversity policy.99  
   
  While eight firms in all years expressly disclosed the existence of a policy, a group of proxy 
statements were slightly more ambiguous. These disclosures did not use the specific language of 
“policy”; however, the arrangements and practices that the disclosures indicated were in place arguably 
played the same role as a formal diversity policy. In classifying these statements, it may seem prudent to 
strictly construe the actual language each firm employed and to adhere to its literal characterization. 
That said, while the rule provides no guidance on what constitutes a “policy,” SEC Commissioner Luis 
                                                     
98
 Alcoa 2011, supra note 96 at 64; American Electric Power Co, Inc, Definitive Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) (14 
March 2011) at 13; Baker Hughes Inc, Definitive Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) (28 April 2011) at 12; Ibid; 
Entergy Corp, Definitive Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) (24 March 2011) at 12 [Entergy 2011].  
99
 Occidental Petroleum Corp, Definitive Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) (24 March 2011) at 51; Procter & 
Gamble Co, Definitive Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) (26 August 2011) at 6 [Procter & Gamble 2011]; Regions 

















Not a final version. Final version forthcoming in Challenging Boardroom Homogeneity: Corporate Law, Governance, and 




Aguilar has warned against imposing a “false distinction” between formal and informal policies and has 
opined that the rule requires the disclosure of both.100  
 
  I coded these more nebulous statements as “functional equivalent” to capture the existence of 
informal diversity policies. In many of these disclosures, the firm relied on an underlying document, such 
as a guideline, code, or matrix, in reporting on its diversity-related practices. Devon Energy, for example, 
reported that under its Governance Committee’s Charter, the governance committee must periodically 
assess the board’s composition against a range of factors, including “diversity of skills, background and 
experience.” The committee relies on the same factors when assessing candidates for the board.101 
UnitedHealth Group reported the integration of diversity into a skills matrix.102 The firm’s nominating 
committee “evaluates potential Board candidates against the skills matrix when determining whether to 
recommend that the Board appoint the candidate to be a director.”103 While the firm states that it “has 
not adopted a formal definition of diversity,” I classified its 2011 disclosure (for example) as including 
the “other experiential” diversity definition in light of the following statement: “We encourage diversity 
and inclusion in all our business operations. Our Board’s consideration of nominees for director reflects 
its consideration of diversity and the broad range of experience, skills and attributes that should be 
represented on the Board.”104 Following from this, the firm reported that its yearly evaluation process 
includes “an assessment of the overall composition of the Board, including the diversity of its 
members.”105  
 
  The disclosures of Boeing and Costco provide additional examples of the “functional equivalent” 
coding. In the case of Boeing, its Governance, Organization, and Nominating Committee considers 
diversity as one of many factors in the assessment of a potential director’s qualifications. The committee 
and the board also administer annual self-evaluations that involve an examination of whether both have 
given sufficient consideration to diversity, among other things, in identifying and deliberating on 
director candidates.106 As set out in its Corporate Governance Principles, the company considers 
diversity holistically, with reference to “background, experience, skills, race, gender and national 
origin.”107 Costco’s Corporate Governance Guidelines set out the characteristics it seeks for directors, 
which include diversity. The guidelines further provide for a triennial self-assessment of board 
performance that the company’s Nominating and Governance Committee oversees. This process 
identifies any areas for improvement in governance, including board diversity “in terms of viewpoints, 
backgrounds and experiences.”108  
 
I distinguished the above proxy statements coded as “functional equivalent” and statements in 
which the corporation indicated that it “instructed its executive search firm to include diversity as part 
of the candidate search criteria”109 from disclosures that merely listed diversity as a desired factor. I 
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coded the latter as “no” in determining whether the firm had a diversity policy. I coded disclosures as 
“functional equivalent” when they articulated an actual process for the inclusion of diversity in 
composing the board, because these disclosures reflect a higher level of commitment to diversity, 
however defined, and therefore suggested the existence of a policy, however informal. If a firm 
specifically disclaimed the existence of a diversity policy, I did not code the disclosure as “functional 
equivalent,” even if it otherwise mentioned elements of diversity. 
 
(ii) Reporting on policy implementation and effectiveness 
 
I scrutinized the eight proxy statements that expressly disclosed the existence of a diversity 
policy for their compliance with the rule’s requirements that firms describe how they implement the 
policy and how they assesses the policy’s effectiveness.  
 
  With respect to implementation, I coded the disclosures “yes” if the firm described in some 
manner how it operationalized its policy (if at all) and “no” if it did not. With respect to effectiveness, I 
coded the disclosures “yes” if the firm described either: (i) a process for assessing the efficacy of the 
policy; or (ii) the results of such a process. Concerning (ii), I considered firms that communicated the 
number of “diverse” directors on the board in a given year (for example, the number of female and 
racialized directors)110 compliant with the effectiveness requirement, because a description of 
effectiveness is implicit in the reporting of results. In other words, in these cases, the board assesses the 
efficacy of its policy with reference to the end result—the level of diversity achieved. I coded the 
disclosures “no” if the firm communicated neither (i) nor (ii).  
 
In all years of the study, each of the eight firms coded “yes” for the existence of a diversity 
policy met the implementation reporting requirement, and all but one met the effectiveness reporting 
requirement as well. Table 6.4 presents a breakdown of the eight firms’ specific and overall compliance. 
By way of illustration, Procter & Gamble reported that, in furtherance of its Corporate Governance 
Guidelines, it “seeks to achieve a mix of Board members that represents a diversity of background and 
experience, including with respect to age, gender, international background, race and specialized 
experience.”111 Further, it disclosed that:  
 
[t]he Board assesses the effectiveness of its diversity policy every year as part of the 
nomination process for the annual election of Directors by the Company’s shareholders. 
The Board’s Governance & Public Responsibility Committee, responsible for making 
recommendations for Director nominations to the full Board, reviews the Director 
nominees (including shareholder nominees) and ascertains whether, as a whole, the 
group meets the Board’s policy in this regard.112 
 
While not required by the rule, the firm took the additional step of providing the results of its self-
assessment: “Having reviewed the collective background and experience of the 11 nominees, the Board 
has concluded that they provide sufficient diversity to meet the Board’s policy.”113  
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Exhibiting less detail, but similarly compliant, Regions Financial disclosed that it has “no formal 
process for implementing [its] policy” but that “the Board performs an annual self-evaluation and board 
diversity is part of the evaluation about which each Director is asked to make an assessment.”114 
Similarly, Colgate-Palmolive revealed that its Governance Committee implements its diversity policy 
“through its director recruitment efforts” and that the policy’s effectiveness is assessed “regularly 
through Board and committee self-evaluations.”115 By contrast, Entergy Corporation disclosed that it 
assessed its policy’s effectiveness but did not explain how it did so; it disclosed only that the firm’s 
Corporate Governance Committee “annually evaluates the effectiveness of its policy and procedures for 
the evaluation of director candidates.”116 I concluded that this statement did not meet the effectiveness 
reporting requirement.  
 
Table 6.4 – Breakdown of firm reporting on policy implementation/effectiveness and overall compliance (2010–2013) 
 
  Implementation Effectiveness Overall compliance  
  Yes No Yes No Yes No 
1 Alcoa Inc  N.A. Alcoa Inc  Entergy Corp  Alcoa Inc  Entergy Corp  
2 American Electric Power  
 
American Electric Power  
 
American Electric Power  
 
3 Colgate-Palmolive  Colgate-Palmolive Co  Colgate-Palmolive  
 
4 Entergy Corp  Occidental Petroleum  Occidental Petroleum  
5 Occidental Petroleum  Procter & Gamble  Procter & Gamble  
6 Procter & Gamble  Regions Financial Corp  Regions Financial Corp  
7 Regions Financial Corp  Baker Hughes Inc Baker Hughes Inc 
   8    Baker Hughes Inc       
 
Stage 3: Regulatory response subsequent to corporate reporting 
 
 The SEC monitors corporate disclosure in different ways. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, for 
example, requires the agency to administer filing reviews of each reporting issuer’s periodic disclosures 
“on a regular and systematic basis” and at least once every three years.117 More generally, the agency’s 
Division of Corporation Finance conducts selective examinations of various registrant filings, focusing on 
“critical disclosures that appear to conflict with Commission rules . . . and on disclosure that appears to 
be materially deficient in explanation or clarity.”118 In the case of a selective review, the Division’s 
evaluation may include a company’s complete filings, the financial statements and related documents 
only, or various filings to ascertain compliance with requirements pertaining to a specified issue.119  
 
The division provides feedback, if any, to companies via a comment letter. This letter begins a 
dialogical process during which the regulator may seek further information from the corporation, 
revisions to existing filings, or enhanced disclosure in future documents. Firms typically respond in 
writing to each issue set out in an SEC comment letter, providing a reaction or explanation. These 
responses, in turn, may trigger additional correspondence from the regulator. The exchange continues 
until the parties reach a resolution.120 This process is the agency’s principal way of monitoring firms’ 
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compliance with disclosure obligations.121 While the SEC’s comment letters are tied to the particular 
facts of the disclosure to which the agency is responding and do not create binding precedent,122 they 
provide market actors and their counsel with valuable normative guidance for subsequent filings and 
reflect the SEC’s interpretation of its rules.  
 
With this process in mind, in stage 3 of my analysis, I assessed how the regulator responded to 
firms’ diversity disclosures. How many firms in the sample received a diversity-related comment letter? 
What was the nature of the SEC’s observations and what do its observations reveal about its approach 
to the rule? How did issuers receive or interpret the agency’s guidance?  
 
As set out in Figure 6.10, below, 6 percent of firms in the sample received a diversity-related 
comment letter in 2010, while no firms received a letter in 2011–2013.123 In all cases but one, the SEC 
reviewed the firm’s definitive proxy statement and subsequently sent a comment letter with board 
diversity–related content.124 Each firm submitted a response letter and the SEC eventually ended the 
dialogues by sending a concluding letter confirming the completion of its review. In all instances, only 
the initial letter and reply addressed board diversity, and I analyzed these first two letters sent between 
the regulator and the firms. 
 
Figure 6.10 – Firms that received diversity-related comment letters from the SEC (n=100, 2010–2012; n=98, 2013) 
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  In four of the six cases, the exchanges between the SEC and firms highlight the confusion that 
has arisen in the diversity reporting process. The agency asked American Electric Power (“AEP”) for 
specific detail as to “whether, and if so how, the board considers diversity in identifying nominees for 
director,” specifically referring to Item 407(c)(2)(vi), the provision that contains the disclosure rule.125 
But the firm had already provided robust disclosure in its filing: 
Two central objectives in selecting board members and continued board service are that 
the skills, experiences and perspectives of the Board as a whole should be broad and 
diverse. . . . In particular, the Board should be balanced by having complementary 
knowledge, expertise and skill in areas such as business, finance, accounting, marketing, 
public policy, manufacturing and operations, government, technology, environmental 
and other areas that the Board has decided are desirable and helpful to fulfilling its role. 
Diversity in gender, race, age, tenure of board service, geography and background of 
directors, consistent with the Board’s requirements for knowledge, standards, and 
experience, are desirable in the mix of the Board. Our Directors and Corporate 
Governance Committee considers these criteria each year as it determines the slate of 
directors to recommend to the Board for election at our annual meeting. It also 
considers these criteria each time a new director is recommended for election to the 
Board. The Board believes that its implementation of this policy is effective in 
considering the diversity of the members of the Board.126 
 
Though the SEC in its letter did not request information about a formal diversity policy, AEP responded 
to the letter by telling the commission that it “does not have a policy with regard to the consideration of 
diversity in identifying nominees for directors” and indicated that it would disclose that fact in future 
proxy statements.127 If AEP did not consider itself to have a policy, committing itself to disclose that fact 
in the future exceeds the requirements of the rule, which does not require firms to disclose the absence 
of a policy. Further, given that the original disclosure did in fact refer to a “policy,”128 it is unclear why 
AEP responded in this fashion. Perhaps the firm’s apparent disavowal of a policy represents an effort to 
backpedal after having attracted scrutiny from the regulator to avoid future scrutiny.  
 
 The SEC requested that American Express and Baker Hughes provide, respectively, “a proposed 
disclosure that covers all of the information required by [Item] 407(c)(2)(vi) . . . and [confirmation] that 
you will include such information in future filings”129 and “complete disclosure regarding your director 
nomination process pursuant to Regulation S-K, Item 407(c)(2)(vi).”130 American Express responded by 
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advising that it had considered its disclosures through the lens of the rule’s requirements. It then 
concluded, before referring the SEC to the relevant sections and page numbers of its proxy statement: 
“With respect to Item 407(c)(2)(vi), the Company believes that its disclosures contain all information 
required by such item.”131 The firm’s response appears sound; in this study, I classified its 2010 proxy 
statement as “generic” in its consideration of diversity, given the firm’s linkage of diversity with 
“perspectives, sound advice and critical viewpoints.” While the statement did not exhibit a particularly 
high level of diversity-related content, it is clear that it met the requirements of the rule.132 Like AEP, the 
company additionally disclosed that it does not have a policy;133 though again, this disclosure was not 
required by the rule, thus putting American Express in a state of overcompliance as well. 
  
Baker Hughes also responded by arguing that it had “already provided complete disclosure 
regarding its director nomination process pursuant to Regulation S-K, Item 407(c)(2)(vi)” and pointed 
the SEC to the germane portions of its proxy statement.134 It is also apparent that this firm met the 
diversity consideration requirements of the rule; my study shows that its 2010 proxy statement 
addressed gender, race/ethnicity, experiential, demographic, and generic diversity under my 
classification scheme.135  
 
  The SEC initiated dialogue with Baxter International by making the following request: “We note 
[from] your disclosure . . . that ‘[d]iversity of background’ is a relevant factor in the selection of directors 
process. In future filings please describe how this policy is implemented, as well as how the corporate 
governance committee assesses the effectiveness of its policy as requested by Item 407(c)(2)(vi) of 
Regulation S-K.”136 From this passage, we see that the SEC interpreted the company’s disclosure as 
referencing a policy and sought information on how that policy is implemented and how its efficacy is 
assessed. In its proxy statement, however, while Baxter clearly set out how diversity is considered in its 
board nomination process,137 it did not use the term “policy” to describe its diversity-related 
practices.138 Indeed, this is in contrast with other aspects of its proxy statement where it discussed, for 
example, its “policy” regarding related person transactions139 and the preapproval “policy” of its audit 
committee vis-à-vis the receipt of services from its independent accounting firm.140  
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Correspondingly, Baxter’s response to the SEC clarified that the disclosure it provided “was 
intended to address the requirement . . . that companies indicate whether, and if so how, diversity is 
considered in identifying directors” but that the firm “has not adopted a policy requiring the 
consideration of diversity.”141 Baxter further advised that “[i]f such a policy is adopted, we will provide 
disclosure on the existence of the policy as well as how such policy is implemented and assessed for 
effectiveness in future filings.”142 In other words, since Baxter does not view itself as having a policy, it 
was not required to fulfil the rule’s implementation and effectiveness requirements. While Baxter ends 
its response on a note of compromise, stating that it will dispel any confusion surrounding its treatment 
of the term diversity in subsequent filings,143 it is clear that the firm—contrary to the SEC’s 
interpretation—was in compliance. I should note that this study classified Baxter’s 2010 proxy 
statement as “functional equivalent” with respect to the existence of a policy since its corporate 
governance guidelines outline the factors it considers in selecting directors, including various diversity-
related indicators.144 As such, some degree of ambiguity as to whether a policy exists is understandable. 
However, rather than seeking clarification on whether the firm has a policy,145 the SEC simply assumed 
that a policy was in place.  
 
Concluding remarks: firms’ consideration of diversity pre- and post-SEC rule 
 
  The disclosures issuers have submitted thus far under the SEC diversity rule give rise to 
questions such as whether the rule will be effective in promoting diversity on corporate boards and 
whether any such focus it has produced emphasizes the “right” forms of diversity. I discuss these 
questions in chapter 7, where I contextualize the discursive data I presented in this chapter within 
academic literature on social norms and expressive law, and then provide recommendations for reform.  
 
To fully contextualize and evaluate the rule, one piece of description visible in my sample will be 
helpful. In addition to collecting proxy statements for the four years since the SEC rule came into effect, I 
collected the 2009 definitive proxy statements of the S&P 100 sample, which were the statements filed 
in the year before the diversity disclosure rule came into effect. Comparing the 2009 prerule data to the 
2010–2013 postrule data, I found that firms considered diversity to a notably greater extent subsequent 
to the rule’s implementation. Whereas 98 percent of proxy statements reflected diversity consideration 
in 2010–2013, in 2009, 76 percent of proxies reflected consideration of diversity.146 Figure 6.11 presents 
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Figure 6.11 – Overall firm consideration of diversity prerule (2009) and postrule (2010–2013) 
A 76 percent consideration rate may appear high, but I found a marked difference in the content 
of the prerule disclosures. Many firms in 2009 (25 percent) simply included the term “diversity” in a list 
of factors they considered in the director nomination process without further explication. Firms that 
discussed diversity in their 2010–2013 proxies, by contrast, provided much more detailed information. 
In each of the years 2010–2013, for example, roughly half of proxy statements indicated that the firms 
considered gender, and similar (albeit lower) percentages referred to race or ethnicity. In 2009, only 14 
percent and 13 percent of firms mentioned gender and race or ethnicity, respectively. Not surprisingly, 
this same pattern appeared in relation to all six of the variables I studied. Figure 6.12 presents a 
statistical comparison of how firms considered diversity pre- and postrule with reference to these six 
variables. 
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Of course, even though the SEC rule has undoubtedly catalyzed more frequent discussion of 
diversity in the board nomination process, much remains to be assessed about the rule’s effectiveness 
and desirability. I turn to this analysis in the chapter that follows. 
